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Abstract: 
The collapse of the centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe has triggered 
complex economic reforms in all former communist countries, on their ways towards free-
market economic systems. Their economies have become real, real-scale, and real-time 
research laboratories. The multifaceted and difficult processes of economic transition were 
scientifically examined as far as transition trail, duration, transition strategy. 
Based on the matrix model of economic systems and economic transition, the 
paper is valuing the authors’ previous research work in the area. The main objective is to 
answer to the question: when the economic transition ends (when the economic reform is 
completed). The authors propose several ways to determine the moment when the economic 
transition ends, and the duration of the process respectively. Several standpoints (political, 
economical, managerial) are presented. 
The study was completed in Romania and Slovak Republic. The research results 
reveal similarities as well as differences; specific issues are discussed. 
Assessing the end of economic transition is of top importance in the 
circumstances of the current global crisis. When the economic recession and transition are 
overlapping, then the “pendulum effect” might appear and the economic reform ends before 
reaching its objectives. 
The models of analysis and research results are important for both academics 
and practitioners – strategists, policy makers, and managers – not only from Romania and 
Slovakia or other Eastern European countries but any transitional economy. 
 
Keywords: matrix model, economic transition, end of transition, duration of transition, 
Romania, Slovakia 
 
1. Introduction 
There are two decades now since 1989, when the system of centrally 
planned economy has collapsed: it started in Poland, extended in former communist 
East European countries and demolished the Soviet Union itself. The scientists were 
not prepared for such an event: there was no valid theory of economic reform to rely 
on – as there was no such precedent. However, developing a model of such a 
complex process as economic transition is a substantial challenge. 
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2. Brief literature review 
Since early 90s, a considerable literature has been developed, screening the 
various aspects of the transition in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. “Four 
kinds of Western political science literature” were already identified (Tőkés, 2000): 
 Synthetic overviews – which consider the collapse of communist regimes as 
part of the global democratization trend; 
 Regional studies – emphasizing the fall of authoritarian regimes in a specific 
region (Latin America, Soviet Union, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe), 
eventually interlinked; 
 Comparative studies – focused on communism analysis; 
 Specific studies – based on authors’ on-site experience as well as academic 
background – making a distinction between general and distinctive factors that 
played a role in communism fall, in both pre- and post-communist situations. 
Such a complex transition process was not possible without involving 
influential organizations as financial institutions and political bodies. Kolodko 
(2001) mentions the ten points of agreement following to the “1989 Washington 
Consensus” – which are still valid issues of the economic transition: fiscal discipline 
(limited budget deficit); public expenditure priorities set; tax reform; financial 
liberalization; unified exchange rate set; trade liberalization; foreign direct 
investment; privatization; deregulation; property rights (Kolodko, 2001: 50-51). 
“The World Bank Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market” has 
clearly emphasized that initial conditions are critical and decisive actions should be 
taken: sustained reforms associated with social policies; creation of proper 
institutions in support of markets; investing in human resource (World Bank, 1996). 
However, the investment in people – in a broad sense – failed in many cases: the 
business culture has developed at a slower pace. The lack of business culture, and 
difficult understanding of the proper meaning and wording have created confusing 
situations: lots of people rejected planning (the very first attribute of the modern 
management) as being opposed to the market! 
The first decade of transition is sharply analyzed (Blejer and Škreb, 2001; 
Linn, 2001; de Larosière, 2001; World Bank, 2002). In some countries, the transition 
has started even earlier – as in Poland (Dabrowski, 2001) or Bulgaria (Mihov, 2001). 
In the Eastern Germany, the economic transition was associated with the unification 
as well as “experiments and experiences” (von Hagen and Strauch, 2001). In some 
countries the reform was perceived as smoother – as in Slovenia (Bole, 2001), Czech 
Republic (Dlouhý, 2001) or even Hungary (Halpern and Neményi, 2001) – while in 
other countries the economic reform was born by “travails and pains” as in Romania 
(Dăianu, 2001) or associated with “problems” as in Ukraine (Åslund, 2001). 
The economic transition has produced winners and losers from reform 
(World Bank, 2002). Analysis of the first ten years of reforms in Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union has shown that “At the beginning of the new millennium, a 
profound divide lies between Central and Southeastern Europe and the Baltics 
(CSB) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the CSB, officially 
measured gross domestic product (GDP) bounced back from a transition recession, 
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recovered to its 1990 level by 1998, and exceeded that level by 6 percent in 2000. 
However, in the CIS GDP in 2000 stood at only 63 percent of its 1990 level. While 
GDP in Poland, the most populous country in the CSB, increased by more than 40 
percent between 1990 and 1999, it shrank by 40 percent during the same period in 
the Russian Federation, the most populous country in the CIS.” (World Bank, 2002: 
xiii). Although, the economic efficiency in Poland was the main research issue 
(Goncharuk, 2006). 
A number of publications opened their columns to publish studies and 
results of the real-time research focused on the economic reforms and transition 
processes which were developed in former communist countries: Post-Communist 
Economies (formerly Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 
Routledge), Managing Global Transitions (Inderscience), Economics of Transition 
(Wiley), Problems of Economic Transition (a journal of translations from Russian), 
and others. Beyond Transition is a notable research newsletter about the reforming 
economies, published by The World Bank Group [available online at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/archives.htm]. The prestigious journal 
Post-Communist Economies  has published, systematically, well-documented 
articles on various economic sectors, in different transition countries as: Azerbaijan 
(Sabi, 1997), Bulgaria (Mihaylova and Howe, 1998), Croatia (Cengic, 1996), (East) 
Germany (Hölscher, 1997), Hungary (Mihalyi, 1996), Poland (Kaminski, 1998), 
Romania (Hunya, 1998), Russia (Magomedov, 1998), Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
(Abazov, 1997), Ukraine (Ishaq, 1997; von Hirschhausen, 1998). The critical issue 
of economic development is important for each individual country as well as for an 
entire region – it could be either Central Asia or Eastern Europe (Brzeski and 
Colombatto, 1999). 
Considering its complexity, the development of an “easy-to-understand” but 
working model of economic transition was a challenge for many researchers. Using 
a political economy approach, Marangos (2005) has identified and developed five 
alternative models of transition: Shock Therapy, the Neoclassical Gradualist model, 
the Post-Keynesian model of transition, the Pluralistic Market Socialist, and the 
Non-Pluralistic Market Socialist model of transition (the Chinese model). 
Confusingly, this complex typology presents definition elements of both economic 
transition (as shock therapy) and economic system (others). 
The purpose of this paper is to present a comprehensive model of 
economic systems, able to be used as background while studying the economic 
transition process. Known as “Matrix Model”, it was developed and used to analyze 
the Romanian and other centralized economies in transition for almost two decades 
(Ardelea and Scarlat, 1991; Scarlat, 1994, 2001, 2003, 2005; Scarlat and Richevaux, 
2006; Scarlat and Scarlat, 2007). The Matrix Model can be used for analyzing the 
economic transition (duration, trajectory, end of the transition process). The results 
are confirmed by parallel research: an innovative approach, based on the chaos 
theory, is proposed by Scarlat and Scarlat (2008) to assess the degree of 
centralization that characterizes the management of any economic system. This 
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paper extensively uses results previously presented by Scarlat, Tatic and Scarlat 
(2007), Scarlat (2009). 
3. The Matrix Model 
Any economic system is described by a certain number of features; more 
features, more information and – finally – better described economic system. 
However, the issue is to investigate the possibility to characterize (any) economic 
system by a minimum number of parameters, in order to simplify the analysis as 
much as we can (but they still describe the system completely). The basic 
assumption is that any economic system can be characterized by two major 
elements, considered as determining features: 
 The type of ownership that could be, basically, state ownership or private 
ownership (the intermediate or mixed ownership is accepted); 
 The type of management adopted by businesses/organizations active within 
the economic system. 
It is agreed to define the management type as centralized if all the vital 
decisions are made at the macroeconomic level (government), and the decentralized 
management, where decisions are made at the microeconomic (organization) level 
(intermediate forms of management are also accepted). The 
centralization/decentralization degree can be measured by the level at which the vital 
economic decisions are made: higher the level, higher the centralization. Such vital 
decisions – considered at the company level – are considered: company mission and 
strategy, budget, company suppliers and clients, pricing policy, personnel policy 
(number, structure, salaries, hiring and firing), investments, acquisitions and 
mergers, insolvency and bankruptcy (Scarlat and Scarlat, 2007). 
The result of these assumptions is a two-by-two matrix model, which defines 
four basic economy types (Figure 1): 
I. Free-market economy (defined by private ownership and decentralized 
management). 
II. Economy of monopoly (private ownership and centralized management). 
III. Economy of command (centrally planned: state ownership and centralized 
management). 
IV. “Social market” economy (state ownership and decentralized management). 
             
 FIGURE 1: The matrix model of economic systems (Scarlat, 1994) 
TYPE OF: 
ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 
Centralised Decentralised 
OWNERSHIP Private 
I 
 
ECONOMY OF 
MONOPOLY 
II 
 
FREE-MARKET 
ECONOMY 
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State 
ECONOMY OF 
COMMAND 
          III 
“SOCIAL-
MARKET” 
ECONOMY 
           IV 
From the management standpoint, the description of the proposed model starts 
from two basic prerequisites: 
 Private ownership, opposed to the public one, generates motivation; 
 Decentralization determines the flexibility of management systems and 
processes. 
The economic systems based on private ownership lead to increased 
motivation while using the resources; and systems managed in a decentralized manner 
are more flexible than the centralized ones. Overall, the economic system based on free 
market competition appears more efficient than the economy of command. The 
economic history of the twentieth century is an overwhelming confirmation. As shown 
by Bitzenis (2007), a successful transition process from communism to democracy 
and market economy may be a tool for the economic development of a country. 
The basic principle of management states that the owner makes the decisions 
(regardless who are the owners – individuals, companies or the government). This 
situation is met in quarters I and III, which corresponds to relatively stable systems. To 
notice that the failure of centrally planned economies (quarter III) is not because of 
management conflicts but mostly because of its rigidity, poor motivation, and low 
efficiency. Any other situation than those described by quadrants I and III means 
conflicts or potential conflicts between owner and decision maker (quarters II and IV). 
It explains the relatively short life of economic (and political) systems corresponding to 
the quarters II and IV. These types of systems might have a reason to exist when 
stronger criteria than economic efficiency act. Such arguments can be: national security 
(cases of war or international conflicts), human life and civilization are in danger (case 
of natural catastrophes). 
The “Scarlat model” can be used to analyze the economic transition as 
well. The transition process – from centrally planned economy (economy of 
command) to the free-market economy – means simultaneous privatization and 
decentralization of the business management (Figure 2). 
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   FIGURE 2: The Matrix Model: transition from economy of  
command to free-market economy 
 
The fundamental problem is choosing and justifying the optimal transition 
management and strategy, defined by: 
 Duration and pace of transition  (“shock” or “gradual” transition) 
 Transition path (trajectory) 
 Privatization techniques – as an essential component of the transition and 
economic reform. 
The proposed model allows analyzing all these aspects. 
The duration/pace of the transition is a critical issue, an essential part of 
any transition strategy. Either “shock therapy” or “gradual transition”, there are 
arguments in favour each of them. However, twenty years of transition offer enough 
hard evidences – as some countries have opted for “shock” while most of them have 
decided to follow the “gradual” path (Giannaros, 2000). It was demonstrated that 
economic efficiency depends on the transition duration (Goncharuk, 2006: 130): 
“while in countries implementing radical market reforms (Poland, Slovenia, 
Hungary etc) this [efficiency] decline was uncontinuous (2-3 years) and then came 
hasty and persistent growth, there were fluctuations of labour productivity dynamics 
in countries with gradual reform (Bulgaria, Romania) or continued decline in 
countries with inconsistent reform (Russia, Ukraine etc).” 
One of the key research areas of transitology is the “periodization” – i.e. 
identification of sub-periods with common characteristics. According to Gungor and 
Yamak (2002), cited by Gubler et al. (2008: 25), the economic transition has 
generally three steps: (1) political and civic reform, (2) reform of legal system, and 
(3) economic liberalization. Šonje and Vujčić (2001) have identified two stages 
during the first decade of transition in Croatia. Scarlat and Scarlat (2007, 2008) have 
applied the concepts of econophysics (fractal structure applied to the exchange rate 
analysis) in case of Romania and detected three phases: 1990-1997 (passive 
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transition), 1998-2002 (active transition – initial), and 2003-2007 (active transition – 
final). 
As far as transition strategic paths to follow, the Matrix Model is a useful 
analysis tool. There are three basic strategies: direct transition - which assumes 
simultaneous privatization and decentralization (directly from III to I); privatization 
followed by decentralization (from III to II followed by II to I); privatization following 
the decentralization (III to IV and then IV to I). In theory, each one has its own pros and 
cons; practically, each country, at a specific moment in time, is more suitable for one 
strategy rather than other, depending on a multitude of factors. However, overall, the 
last path is a potential generator of unemployment while the second path is favouring 
higher inflation. 
Another strategic issue is privatization vs. restructuring – which comes first? 
Privatization was expected to have a significant impact on restructuring of the 
former state-owned sector in Eastern Europe after 1989. However, empirical studies 
show mixed results as far as impact of privatization on the restructuring of large 
companies. The evidence from Romania (Trif, 2008) suggests that privatization does 
not necessarily lead to a deeper restructuring and business profitability. Analysis of 
the privatization process in different countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Iatridis, 1998) has shown different perspectives and approaches. The “optimal” 
answer to the questions regarding the sequence of reforms and their speed is “to convert 
these countries to laissez-faire capitalism, with all its attendant institutions … the 
greater the structural imbalances, the greater the intensity of the necessary shock” 
(Iatridis, 1998: 34-35). In the Preface to the volume presenting the results of the 
research project undertaken by the US National Bureau of Economic Research on 
the transition in Eastern Europe, the design of privatization process is presented as 
part of restructuring: the editors underline “the problems of restructuring – from 
fiscal reform, to labour market structure, to the design of privatisation and 
bankruptcy mechanisms, to the role of foreign direct investment” (Blanchard, Froot, 
and Sachs, 1994: ix). The privatization and private sector development in Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova are described by the World Bank 
experts as parts of the structural adjustment in transition (Siegelbaum et al., 2002). 
There is no “viable universal recipe” for the privatization processes, but some 
mechanisms are known along with their implementation methods. “Privatization” 
means equally all schemes of private sector development: Transfer of property from 
state to private firms or individuals, new small business start-up and development, 
foreign direct investment. The problem is not the incomplete knowledge or 
unsuitable selection of privatization schemes, methods or/and their application 
methodology, but the particular sequence in which these mechanisms are being 
enforced. One of the indexes used to measure the privatization success in countries 
accessing to a market economy is that, in the end, one could reach that level able to 
create, on the basis of privatization, a viable capital market. As enforcing 
methodology and implementing mechanism are concerned, the approach is identical 
for both privatization and capital market implementation processes (Anghel and 
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Scarlat, 2008). The decision makers and political leaders in countries with 
transitional economies have the duty to reflect to, decide upon and enforce the most 
appropriate solutions for their countries.  
 
4. The end of transition 
 
As the EU accession is a transition process itself, the accessing Central 
and Eastern European countries have been “in transition process” twice. The studies 
carried out (Fuerea et al., 2004) confirmed that Romania – like other EU candidate 
countries in economic transition – was aiming a “moving target”: harmonization of 
the Romanian legislation with the acquis communautaire (Community legislation). 
This has created the perception of endless transition. 
The difficulty of assessing the end of transition process is increased 
because each country follows its own transition way. In addition, different experts 
have different opinions. János Kornai is one of the six worldwide famous 
economists who have offered their answers during the 1997-1998 academic year, 
while visiting Western Michigan University. Based on three clear criteria (the 
communist party’s power monopoly terminated; privatization completed; market-
driven economic activities), the answer was positive for most of the transition 
countries (Kornai, 1999). Oppositely, starting from fairly similar criteria, a negative 
answer was offered by Gelb (1999). Moreover, the comprehensive picture of the 
complex transition process is completed by moving beyond transition and discussing 
what it is considered to be “the post-transition policy” (Kornai, 1999). Normally, the 
transformation has its end when the market mechanism functions “normally”, when 
the deformations of the former economic system are eliminated and when the 
economy can generate sustainable economic growth (Morvay, 2005: 6). 
However, formally, there are several standpoints on deciding when the 
transition process is completed: 
 Politically: assessment by the EU (in Country Report) as “functional 
market economy” (this is applicable only to the EU accessing countries); 
 Economically: when the country gross domestic product (GDP) reaches 
the pre-transition level; 
 Strategically: when target/strategic objectives are reached (management 
standpoint) – based on the Matrix Model. 
As all the above may present cross influences, a correlated approach is 
recommended. In case of Romania, the different approaches converge to indicate 
that economic transition got to its end by 2002-2003 (Scarlat and Scarlat, 2007). 
There are also more sophisticated analysis tools – as the analysis of time series and 
applying the theory of chaotic dynamics to economic transition (Scarlat and Scarlat, 
2007, 2008). Considering the main events that occurred in the Romanian political 
and economical environment over a period of 16 years (1990-2005), evidences of 
chaotic dynamics were found; the time series analysis indicates the end of 2001 as 
the end of the transition process – which confirms the conclusion reached by matrix 
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model: 2002-2003 (Scarlat and Scarlat, 2007). Other countries have completed their 
transitions at different moments, sooner or later. 
The economic standpoint has the advantage of objective assessment. 
According to the officially measured GDP, the countries from Central and 
Southeastern Europe and the Baltics bounced back from a transition recession in 
1998; Poland was above the average: its GDP increased by more than 40 percent 
between 1990 and 1999 (World Bank, 2002). 
The role of international bodies is important: the economic transition is 
officially over when the international key-organizations declare it! Considering the 
Copenhagen criteria for EU accession (political democracy, adoption of the acquis 
communautaire, and the capacity to withstand normal market competition within the 
EU), the year of EU accession can be considered the official date of ending the 
transition (May 1, 2004 for Slovak Republic and January 1, 2007 for Romania). 
However, polemics can arise on this issue. 
For the case of Slovakia two moments are important: (i) The year 2000 - 
when OECD has declared Slovakia as the 30th most developed country in the world 
(OECD, 2000); (ii) The year 2008 - when The World Bank has declared that 
Slovakia has graduated from the World Bank financing, i.e. Slovakia is no more a 
transitive country (Part 2) but a country with developed economy (Part 1) (SITA, 
2008; Ministerstvo financií SR, 2008). 
The Matrix Model is able to offer a reliable answer to the sensitive question 
“when the transition process ends” – as it is based on clear and objective data. In 
theory, by the time when the private ownership is prevailing (more than 50% private 
sector) and the business management is dominantly decentralized, then, the free-
market economy system is in place. Reaching the first quarter means that, in 
principle, the process of economic transition towards the free-market economy is 
considered completed (Figure 1). In practice, during the transition process, it is 
necessary to measure both the private ownership percentage and degree of business 
management decentralization and thus the path of economic transition is designed. 
Figure 3 depicts a quantitative model of the transition path, based on the Matrix 
Model. The applicability of this model only depends on the available data about 
privatization and decentralization – considered as independent processes. There are 
situation in which a certain privatization act may come with decentralization effects; 
in this case privatization and decentralization cannot be considered independent 
processes. 
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FIGURE 3: The quantitative model of the transition path 
 
Another major difficulty appears while calculating the privatization and 
decentralization percentages. If privatization data are relatively accessible, the 
percentage of decentralization is rather difficult to estimate; it largely depends not 
only on the year when the respective decentralization legal act was issued but on the 
time by when it effectively works in practice – which needs supplementary research. 
This supplementary research makes the difference between the theoretical and 
practical values of the results. The centralization/decentralization degree can be 
measured by the level at which the vital economic decisions are made: higher the 
decision level, stronger the centralization; lower the level, larger the 
decentralization. In any case, a coherent set of criteria for assessing the degree of 
decentralisation has to be developed. In the following chapter, an alternate method 
to assess the decentralization level as well as the corresponding transition paths in 
several countries is presented. 
The functional market economy means not only reaching the quadrant I, 
but also being able to steadily perform, maintain the performance, and progress in 
that quadrant (stability). Here the role of government has to be emphasized – by 
promoting essential acts as Fair Competition Act, Consumer Protection Act, etc. The 
role of the government is vital in “protecting the borders” as well: Anti-trust 
legislation is securing the border against “Economy of Monopoly” (quarter II) while 
the Property acts are essential for keeping the border against “Social Market 
Economy” (quarter IV). 
 
5. End of transition in Romania and Slovak Republic by Matrix Model 
 
When calculating the degree of decentralization, in the context of the 
Matrix Model, it is worthy to explore the possibility to use alternative indicators for 
assessing the level of decentralisation. As the government has to be the referee in the 
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free-market economy game, not one of the players, its role and implication are 
sometimes rather difficult to assess, mainly in transition economies. Too much 
involvement of the government in the economy means less economic freedom. The 
use of the Index of Economic Freedom as degree of decentralization – in 
conjunction with the Matrix Model – has led to positive results (Scarlat, Tatic, and 
Scarlat, 2007). The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc. are 
annually publishing for 15 years – since 1995 – the world ranking of economic 
freedom, according to the “Index of Economic Freedom” (IEF). The benefit of easy 
access to existing reliable data prevails on disadvantages: supplementary data 
processing – in order to obtain more accurate data, suitable for matrix model (to 
assess the degree of decentralization). In addition to this, the supplementary 
processing of data does not offer too much difference compared to IEF values; for 
example, in case of Romania (2007), the degree of decentralization (supplementary 
data processing) is 63.5 compared to 61.3 (IEF value). Therefore, the values of IEF 
can be considered – with reasonable accuracy – as degree of decentralization. It is 
interesting to note that: 
 Economic freedom is strongly related to good economic performance. Top 
seven countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, 
USA, and Canada) – those scoring between 80-100 points are all considered 
as “free economies”. 
 Only Estonia (on the 13th place) and Lithuania (30th), among ex-communist 
countries, are ranked in the second group of economies, considered as 
“mostly free” (70.0-79.9 points). 
 Majority of ex-communist countries belong to the third (“moderately free”) 
and fourth (“mostly unfree”) groups (60.0-69.9 and 50.0-59.9 points, 
respectively). The exceptions are China, and most of the countries from 
former Yugoslavian Federation and Soviet Union. 
Table 1 depicts the evolution of IEF for Romania and Slovak Republic over 
a period of 15 years. The methodology for IEF calculation is described by Beach and 
Kane (2007), updated (Miller et al., 2009). It is important to note that all IEF factors 
are calculated – according to the methodology – over a period of one year; for 
example, the IEF values for 2009 are calculated for a period of twelve months (last 
six months of 2007 and first six months of 2008), with a few exceptions (inflation 
rate is assessed over a period of three years). Thus, the period presented in Table 1 
(1995-2009) are based on data from 1994-2008. 
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TABLE 1: IEF dynamics in Romania and Slovakia (1995-2009) 
Years Romania Slovakia
1994 42.9 60.4
1995 46.2 57.6
1996 50.8 55.5
1997 54.4 57.5
1998 50.1 54.2
1999 52.1 53.8
2000 50.0 58.5
2001 48.7 59.8
2002 50.6 59.0
2003 50.0 64.6
2004 52.1 66.8
2005 58.2 69.8
2006 61.1 69.6
2007 61.7 70.0
2008 63.2 69.4  
Source: Miller et al., 2009: pp. 335-336, 361-362 
 
Evidently, there were similarities, but each country has followed its own 
transition path, under its particular circumstances. If comparing the two countries, it 
is noticeable that: 
 Overall, both countries reported significant increase of freedom, from 
centralized economy to predominantly decentralized systems (60-70%).  
 Slovakian economy is currently more decentralized than Romanian 
economic system. 
 Depending on local conditions but also EU and global economic 
environment, all countries reported ups and downs; however, the general 
trend was neatly positive. 
 Romania was slower Slovakia reaching its break of 50% decentralization. 
 Slovak Republic has reported a certain regress as far as decentralization 
during late 90s; it came back after 2003. 
 For Romania, 2001-2004 was a period of relative fair regress (degree of 
decentralization around 50%), as compared to more dynamic periods (1995-
1998 and 2005-2009); in addition to this, it is detectable how the election 
years (1996, 2000, 2004) – associated with governments of opposite 
orientation each time – have impacted the economic freedom. 
 The change in the IEF methodology (2006-2007) did not influence 
significantly the results. 
The most recent tops reported by Slovakia (around 70%) might be 
symptoms of “pendulum effect”: their economic systems will probably stabilize 
around those figures. 
For Romania, at this point in time, it is rather difficult to foresee the 
equilibrium point in terms of decentralization level. It is likely that Romania will 
continue at a slower pace and stabilize later – at a pretty similar value (65-70%) – 
unless the global crisis will change the perspective in this respect. Actually, there are 
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two issues of further research while studying the influence of the global crisis on 
decentralization: (i) how the global crisis impacts the decentralization level (seen as 
an optimal level or key-objective targeted by the government) and, consequently, (ii) 
how the crisis influences the decentralization as a process. If the decentralization 
pace is too slow, the crisis might disrupt the process. 
In order to display the path followed by the two countries in their 
economic transition to free-market economy, then the private ownership percentage 
should be represented on the vertical axis while the degree of decentralization is 
pointed on the horizontal axis (as in Figure 3). The number of points in the diagram 
equals the number of sets of available data (number of years). The transition path 
corresponds to the connecting line – as displayed in Figure 4.1 (Romania) and 
Figure 4.2 (Slovak Republic) – for a period of 15 years (1994-2008). The period is 
restricted because of the data availability (IEF is calculated starting with 1995). The 
Romanian transition path is represented considering the privatization target as 100% 
(in relative figures, regardless the absolute value of the private sector in economy). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1: Matrix Model applied to Romania (1994-2008) 
Privatization target considered as 100% 
 
Source: Own research and Miller et al., 2009: 335-336 
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FIGURE 4.2: Matrix Model applied to Slovakia (1994-2008) 
 
Source: Own research and Miller et al., 2009: 361-362 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Some observations and comments should be made related to the diagrams: 
 The transition in Romania was longer and in Slovakia more turbulent (in terms 
of variations of the level of decentralization). 
 By 1994 (the year when our analysis starts), Slovak Republic was having 
already a market economic system and economic transition completed; its 
transition was shorter (reforms started earlier) and the economic system looks 
stabilized. 
 Romanian transition did not end in 1996 (first time when both privatization 
and decentralization were above 50%) because uncertain period followed 
(decentralization level around 50%); it was just after 2003 when the IEF has 
indicated decisive trajectory toward quarter IV. 
 The decentralization process was slower in Romania than in Slovakia. 
 The privatization process in Slovakia was faster than in Romania: it started 
earlier – as visible changes were reported in private ownership from 17.5% in 
1989 to 20.0% in 1990) – and the process was accelerated (53.3% in 1994 
already; 82.6% in 1997). 
The Matrix Model allows identifying, describing, and analyzing the 
reverse transition path: the tendency of the reverse transition from the excessive 
freedom of market economy towards state control (“nationalization”) under the 
pressure of the current financial crisis. The post-transition economic phenomena, in 
the context of the current global financial crisis, unveiled a new trend: de-
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privatisation (nationalization) of the large financial and non-financial institutions1. 
This procedure is not new: the U.S. government has nationalized the railroads in 
World War I; the U.K. government nationalized the British railroad system a few 
times... 
In cases like Romania and Slovak Republic, the new nationalization 
would be a second one in history – which suggests a cyclic transition or “pendulum 
effect”: 
 First nationalization – transition from free-market economy to centrally 
planned economy (Romania, 1948: Nationalization Act) 
 Transition from communist economy of command to the free-market 
economy (Romanian transition: 1989-2002) 
 Second nationalization (?) 
The Matrix Model allows analyzing the path of this cyclic transition in a 
specific country as well as cross-country comparative studies. 
 
7. Limitations and further research 
As mentioned, the split between private/state or centralized/decentralized is 
pretty rigid. The Matrix Model can be improved, considering both ownership and 
decentralization as having continuous variation: ownership percentage and degree of 
decentralization. The quantitative version of the proposed model allows investigating 
the real transition path followed by any country. 
The transition model has unlimited potential as long as data are available – 
in order to calculate the privatization and decentralization percentages. Privatization 
data should be relatively accessible but the percentage of decentralization is rather 
difficult to estimate. It largely depends not only on the year when a specific 
regulatory act was issued in that specific country but on the moment by when it 
effectively works in practice – which needs additional research. For this reason, the 
Index of Economic Freedom may be used as decentralization degree. 
The Matrix Model can be further developed by adding a third dimension – 
linked to the size of the economy (GDP, population). 
The centralization/decentralization degree can be measured by the level at 
which the vital economic decisions are made. It is room for further research on a 
coherent set of criteria for assessing the degree of decentralisation as well as the 
correlation between the degree of decentralization calculated as such and the IEF. 
                                                            
1 According to the news agencies, Saudi Arabia has nationalized its oil industry (Business Week, July 
28, 2008:78); the U.S. government currently buys equity stakes in U.S. banking system, which becomes 
more “state owned”, following to the hundreds of billions of dollars committed by the government 
(Pete Engardio: Forget Adam Smith. Whatever Works, Business Week, October 27, 2008: 22-24). On 
Monday June 1, the Associated Press has announced “the temporary nationalization” of the US 100-
year-old company General Motors Corp. On April 15, the press agencies spread the rumour that 
Romanian government might take over the petrochemical unit of the largest Romanian private 
company, Petrom. 
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Each IEF group of factors has different impact as far as assessing the 
decentralization level. The accuracy of measurement will increase if only groups of 
factors with higher influence will be selected. The further analysis might be 
deepened in this respect. 
There are lots of particular aspects of the transition process in each 
specific country – regarding methods and results of privatization, market 
institutions, etc – which may be subjects for further research work. 
The transition paths can be further analyzed using more sophisticated 
mathematical tools as theory of deterministic chaos and fractal analysis. 
Post-transition economic phenomena, in the context of the current global 
financial crisis, unveiled a new area of research. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The Matrix Model is fully applicable to all Eastern European countries or 
any other transitional economy. Its applicability only depends on available data 
about privatization and decentralization. The Matrix Model is a reliable research tool 
to investigate the economic transition process – its trajectory, strategy as well as its 
completion. The Index of Economic Freedom is a good estimator for the 
decentralization level; consequently, it can be used in conjunction with the Matrix 
Model. 
The analysis of different transition paths permits comparative studies – 
regardless the transition sense (direct or reverse transition). 
The use of the Matrix Model reveals similarities among the transition 
countries (as Romania and Slovak Republic) but noticeable differences (as delays) 
are also identified. The results are encouraging to deepen the research, and extend 
the use of the Matrix Model to other transition economies and eventually to develop 
recommended patterns for successful transition strategies. 
The end of the transition processes can be estimated based on the Matrix 
Model as well: the process is completed when private ownership and 
decentralization prevail. 
The Matrix Model allows identifying, describing, and analyzing the 
tendency of the reverse-transition from the excessive freedom of market economy 
towards state control (de-privatisation or nationalization) under the pressure of the 
current financial crisis. In cases like Romania or Slovakia, the new nationalization 
would be a second one in history – which suggests a cyclic transition or “pendulum 
effect”. The decentralization figures reported by Slovakia in recent years might be 
symptoms of “the pendulum effect”: its economic system will probably stabilize 
around those figures. 
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